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Abstract
This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to assess the
efficiency impacts of two policies to reduce U.S. carbon emissions – a revenue-neutral carbon
tax and a non-auctioned carbon quota – taking into account the interactions between these
policies and pre-existing tax distortions in factor markets.  We show that tax interactions
significantly raise the costs of both policies relative to what they would be in a first-best
setting.  In addition, we show that these interactions put the carbon quota at a significant
efficiency disadvantage relative to the carbon tax: for example, the costs of reducing
emissions by 10 percent are more than three times as high under the carbon quota as under the
carbon tax.  This disadvantage reflects the inability of the quota policy to generate revenue
that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes.
Indeed, second-best considerations can limit the potential of a carbon quota to
generate overall efficiency gains.  Under our central values for parameters, a non-auctioned
carbon quota (or set of grandfathered carbon emissions permits) cannot increase efficiency
unless the marginal benefits from avoided future climate change are at least $17.8 per ton of
carbon abatement.  Most estimates of marginal environmental benefits are below this level.
Thus, our analysis suggests that any carbon abatement by way of a non-auctioned quota will
reduce efficiency.  In contrast, our analysis indicates that a revenue-neutral carbon tax can be
efficiency-improving so long as marginal environmental benefits are positive.
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WHEN CAN CARBON ABATEMENT POLICIES INCREASE WELFARE?
THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF DISTORTED FACTOR MARKETS
Ian W. H. Parry, Roberton C. Williams III, and Lawrence H. Goulder *
I.   INTRODUCTION
The prospect of global climate change from the continued atmospheric accumulation
of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases has prompted analysts to consider a
number of policy options for mitigating emissions of CO2.  The issue has attained heightened
importance since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997, when 160 nations
resolved to reduce emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.  This paper focuses on
alternative ways that the U.S. might achieve significant reductions in CO2 emissions.  The
crucial point of departure from previous studies of CO2 abatement policies1 is the present
paper's focus on connections between the efficiency impacts of CO2 abatement policies and
pre-existing tax distortions.  The motivation for this focus stems from recent studies of
environmental regulation in a second-best setting.  These papers have shown that the costs of
environmental regulations are higher in a world with pre-existing factor market distortions
than they would be in the absence of such distortions.2  The higher costs reflect two effects.
First, by raising the costs of production in the affected industry, environmental regulations
give rise to higher prices of output in that industry and thus a higher price of consumption
goods in general.  This, in turn, implies a lower real wage and a reduction in labor supply.  If
there are pre-existing taxes on labor, the reduction in labor supply has a first-order – that is,
non-incremental – efficiency cost, which has been termed the tax-interaction effect.
Second, under some environmental policies, another effect can partially offset the tax-
interaction effect.  Pollution taxes and other environmental policies that raise revenue allow
that revenue to be recycled through cuts in the marginal rates of pre-existing distortionary
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taxes.  The lower marginal rates reduce the distortionary costs associated with these taxes,
thus providing an efficiency gain.  This is the revenue-recycling effect.
These considerations are highly relevant to the choice among alternative instruments
for reducing emissions of CO2.  The most frequently cited instruments for dealing with CO2
emissions are carbon taxes, carbon quotas (or "carbon caps"), and marketable carbon emissions
permits.3  All of these policies generate a (costly) tax-interaction effect, but only some of them
can exploit the offsetting revenue-recycling effect.  Carbon taxes, as well as carbon quotas or
tradable permits that are auctioned by the government, enjoy the revenue-recycling effect so
long as the revenues obtained are used to finance cuts in marginal tax rates of distortionary
taxes such as the income tax.  In contrast, grandfathered (non-auctioned) carbon quotas and
permits fail to raise revenues and thus cannot exploit the revenue-recycling effect.  Carbon
taxes whose revenues are returned through lump-sum transfers to households also fail to enjoy
this effect.  This paper shows that the inability to make use of the revenue-recycling effect can
put the latter policies at a substantial efficiency disadvantage relative to the former policies.4
Indeed, the absence of the revenue-recycling effect may make it impossible for the latter
policies to generate overall efficiency gains, despite the benefits from avoided future climate
change!5  These results bear directly on current CO2-abatement policy discussions in the U.S.
and Europe, where grandfathered tradable carbon permits are gaining serious consideration.
In this paper we use analytical and numerically solved general equilibrium models to
contrast the effects of two sorts of policies, where the crucial difference between the two
policies is the presence or absence of the revenue-recycling effect.  These policies are a
carbon tax with revenues devoted to cuts in marginal tax rates, and a non-auctioned carbon
emissions quota.  To our knowledge, this is the first study to compare these CO2-abatement
policies in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes.  As mentioned, the first policy
exploits the revenue-recycling effect, while the second does not.  For simplicity, we apply the
                                               
3 See for example Tietenberg (1991), Poterba (1993), Hoel (1991), Oates and Portney (1992).
4 Some earlier analyses of carbon taxes have recognized the potential importance of the revenue-recycling
effect.  Repetto et al. (1992) and Nordhaus (1993a) indicate that the costs of a carbon tax are much lower when
revenues are returned through cuts in marginal tax rates than when revenues are returned lump-sum.  These
studies make a valid point about the relative costs of policies that do or do not exploit the revenue-recycling
effect.  However, the absolute costs of carbon tax policies are not fully captured in these studies because they do
not integrate pre-existing taxes in the analysis and thus they cannot account for the tax-interaction effect.  The
presence or absence of the revenue-recycling effect can be linked to whether policy-generated rents are captured
by the government and returned to taxpayers (as in the case of a pollution tax) or instead left in producers' hands
(as in the case of pollution quotas or freely offered pollution permits).  On this see Fullerton and Metcalf (1997).
5 The impossibility of efficiency gains was demonstrated through numerical simulations performed by
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996a).  They found that any carbon abatement through a carbon tax policy that
recycles the revenues in lump-sum fashion (and thus does not exploit the revenue-recycling effect) will be
efficiency-reducing, if the marginal environmental benefits from carbon abatement do not exceed a strictly
positive threshold value.  This restriction on environmental benefits does not apply to carbon tax policies
involving recycling through cuts in marginal rates.  The present study differs from the Bovenberg-Goulder study
in decomposing the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects and in examining quota policies (and the
treatment of quota rents) in some detail.Parry, Williams, and Goulder  RFF 97-18-REV
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labels "carbon tax" and "carbon quota" to these policies, since it is cumbersome to refer
repeatedly to the presence or absence of the revenue-recycling effect.  It should be kept in
mind that, as indicated above, some policies involving quotas or tradable permits would share
efficiency properties of our former category, while some policies involving taxes or tradable
permits would share efficiency properties of our latter category.
We begin by deriving analytical formulas indicating that the efficiency costs
associated with the tax-interaction effect can be quite large relative to the direct costs of
carbon abatement considered in typical policy models.  We then perform numerical
simulations that show that the absence of the revenue-recycling effect makes the carbon quota
policy significantly more costly than the carbon tax.  Under central values for parameters, the
marginal costs of emissions abatement begin at approximately $18 per ton under the quota, as
compared with $0 per ton under the revenue-neutral carbon tax.  The quota's minimal
marginal cost of $18 per ton has some powerful implications for policy.  Estimated marginal
benefits from carbon abatement are typically below $18 per ton (see in particular Nordhaus
1991a, 1994).  If marginal benefits are indeed below this value, then only the carbon tax can
produce an efficiency improvement in our model; a carbon quota (or set of grandfathered
tradable permits) necessarily reduces efficiency, and potentially by a large amount.  Clearly,
there is enormous uncertainty as to the potential gains from reducing carbon emissions; as
discussed below, under more extreme scenarios for climate change, benefit estimates can
easily exceed $18 per ton.  Yet even in this case, there is still a very strong efficiency
argument for preferring a carbon tax over a (non-auctioned) quota.  Our numerical results
indicate, for example, that a five percent reduction in carbon emissions is almost six times as
costly under a quota than a carbon tax.
We would emphasize that the absolute costs of the carbon quota, and its cost relative
to that of the carbon tax, are sensitive to different assumptions about labor supply elasticities,
which are difficult to pin down accurately.  Nonetheless, even under extremely conservative
values for labor supply elasticities the marginal cost of the quota at zero abatement still
significantly exceeds the central estimate of $5 per ton for marginal environmental benefits in
Nordhaus (1994).  Our analysis also abstracts from a number of potentially significant
considerations, such as capital accumulation and pre-existing sources of distortion in the
economy due to non-tax factors.  However, as we discuss at the end of the paper, generalizing
the analysis may well strengthen rather than weaken our empirical results.
Our results are consistent with - but in some ways more striking than - the results
obtained by Goulder et. al (1997) in a study of the sulfur dioxide (SO2) permit program under
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  Goulder et al. found that, under central estimates for
marginal environmental benefits from SO2 reductions, a system of grandfathered (freely-
allocated) SO2 permits allows for an improvement in efficiency relative to the unregulated
status quo.  The present study indicates that the prospects for efficiency gains through quotas
or non-auctioned permits are much dimmer in the CO2 context.  Quotas or non-auctioned
permits have a greater chance at yielding efficiency gains in the SO2 case because the central
estimates for marginal environmental benefits are relatively high (compared with marginalParry, Williams, and Goulder  RFF 97-18-REV
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discounted value of the expected utility losses due to induced changes in future global
climate.7  The separability in (II.1) implies that future climatic change does not affect the
relative attractiveness of leisure and the two types of consumption.8
CF and CN are produced under constant returns to scale.  The production functions are
given by:
( ) C C L F N F F F F F = , , ; ( ) C C L F N N N N N N = , , ;  (II.2)
where N is a "clean" (non-polluting) intermediate good.  Labor is the only input used to
produce the intermediate goods F and N, and the marginal product of labor in each of these
two industries is taken to be constant.  We assume that production in all four industries is
competitive.  The use of fossil fuels in the CF and CN industries leads to a proportional amount
of carbon emissions.  This is a standard assumption in energy models: unlike the case of SO2,
there are no economically viable scrubber technologies to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of
fuel input.  Aggregate fossil fuel use is:
F F F F N = +   (II.3)
We choose units to imply one ton of carbon per unit of F.
We do not consider heterogeneity in the costs of emissions abatement among
producers within a given industry.  If regulators have imperfect information about these costs,
in general they will be unable to achieve production efficiency in the allocation of quotas:
marginal costs of abatement are likely to differ across producers.  Under these circumstances
a carbon tax or a system of tradable carbon permits would have an efficiency advantage over
fixed carbon quotas, apart from the advantages associated with revenue-recycling, which are
the focus of our analysis.9
Finally, we assume that the government has an exogenous spending requirement of G,
which is returned to households as a lump sum transfer.  The government also levies a
proportional tax of tL on labor income, and regulates carbon emissions using either a tax or a
non-auctioned quota.  The government budget is assumed to balance, and therefore any
revenue consequences from regulation are neutralized by adjusting the rate of tL.
Denoting the demand prices of CF and CN by pF and pN, and normalizing the gross
wage to unity, the household budget constraint is given by:
                                               
7 Although we focus on the costs to the U.S. of carbon abatement policies, we use environmental benefit
estimates for the world economy.  This seems appropriate since we are dealing with a globally dispersed
pollutant.
8 If pollution were to alter the tradeoff (marginal rate of substitution) between consumption and leisure (as
would be the case if pollution affects consumer health or labor productivity) then the benefits of reduced
pollution could be magnified or diminished by tax interactions.  For more details on this point see Bovenberg
and van der Ploeg (1994) and Williams (1997).
9 Policy analysts have paid considerable attention to this heterogeneity issue and the associated potential gains
from trades.  Perhaps as a result, tradable carbon permits seem to enjoy more political support than non-tradable
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The U.S., in particular, must achieve a level of emissions about seven percent below 1990
levels.  Under business-as-usual conditions, emissions are projected to grow significantly
from the present time until 2008-2012; hence meeting the Kyoto targets would compel the
U.S. to reduce its emissions by considerably more than seven percent.  In our numerical
simulations, we consider emissions reductions ranging from 0 to 25 percent, a range that
seems relevant to the reductions required from the Kyoto Protocol.
We consider a range of estimates for benefits from carbon abatement.  Central
estimates in the literature are typically below $20 per ton (for example, $5 per ton in
Nordhaus 1994).27  The "low" values for the central estimates reflect the notion that
continued accumulation of greenhouse gases will not produce extreme changes in climate
over the next century, and the idea that most economic activities are not exceptionally
sensitive to modest climate change.  In addition, discounting over long periods of time
substantially reduces the benefit estimates, which are present values.  However under extreme
values for climate change, sensitivity of the economy to such change, or discount rates, much
higher benefit estimates arise.  Under an extreme scenario, Nordhaus (1991a), for example,
estimates benefits to be $66 per ton.28  The simulations below aim to span a wide range of
benefit scenarios, considering a range from 0 to 100 dollars per ton.  In all cases, we assume
marginal benefits are constant over the range of emissions reductions.29
IV.   NUMERICAL RESULTS
A.   Marginal Costs of Emissions Reduction
Figure 1 (see page 35) shows how the pre-existing labor tax affects the marginal cost
of reductions in carbon emissions.  The bottom curve is the marginal cost when there is no
distortionary labor tax.  This curve is roughly the same in real terms as that in Nordhaus
(1991b).  The curve is upward sloping, reflecting the increasing difficulty of substituting
fossil fuels for other inputs in production.  In a first-best world, the same curve applies no
matter whether the reduction is achieved by a tax or quota.  In a second-best world, in
contrast, the marginal cost curves differ significantly.  In our central case scenario, which
assumes a pre-existing labor tax (tL0) of 40 percent, the quota policy shifts up the marginal
cost curve, giving it a positive intercept.  This upward shift reflects the tax-interaction effect.
Under the carbon tax, the marginal cost curve pivots upward but retains the zero intercept that
applies in the first-best case.  The middle curve in Figure 1 represents marginal costs under
the carbon tax.  The zero intercept reflects the fact that the revenue-recycling effect exactly
                                               
27 The first benefit estimate was $7 per ton, by Nordhaus (1991a).  Other estimates include $12 (Peck and
Teisberg, 1993) and $20 (Fankhauser, 1994).
28 The estimates have also been criticized for neglecting some ecosystem impacts, potentially adverse effects on
the distribution of world income, and the possibility of non-linearities within the climate system.  Nordhaus
(1993b) provides insightful commentary on these issues.
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offsets the tax-interaction effect at the first increment of abatement.  The zero intercept
implies that the carbon tax can increase welfare so long as marginal benefits from emissions
reduction are positive.  In contrast, under the quota marginal benefits must exceed a strictly
positive value ($17.8 per ton under central-case values for parameters) in order to increase
welfare.  These qualitative results were anticipated by the analytical model.  The value of the
intercept of the marginal cost under the quota is almost identical in both analytical and
numerical models.30
B.   Average Costs of Emissions Reduction
Figure 2 (see page 36) shows the average total cost of reducing carbon emissions under
the tax and quota, expressed relative to the average total cost of the same emissions reduction
in a first-best setting with no pre-existing labor tax.31  For both policies, pre-existing taxes
imply higher costs at all levels of abatement than would occur if the labor tax were zero.  At all
levels of abatement, the cost of the carbon tax is about 22 percent higher when the pre-existing
labor tax is 0.4 than when there is no pre-existing labor tax.32  Under the quota policy, pre-
existing taxes have a much greater impact.  The average total cost of a 5 percent emissions
reduction, for example, is six times as high with pre-existing taxes than without; the average
cost of a 15 percent emissions reduction is 2.6 times as high.  The very high ratios reflect the
fact that the marginal costs of abatement begin at a strictly positive level in a second-best
setting, whereas they start at zero in the absence of prior taxes, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows that, on efficiency grounds, pre-existing taxes put the quota policy at a
considerable disadvantage relative to the tax policy.  For all levels of emissions reduction up
to 25 percent, the cost of the quota is more than double that of the tax.  Whatever the benefits
from reducing carbon emissions, there is a strong efficiency case for preferring the carbon tax
to the carbon quota.  Note that the relative discrepancy between the tax and quota declines
with the level of abatement.  The marginal tax-interaction effect is approximately constant,
but marginal tax revenue and hence the marginal revenue-recycling effect is declining.  This
occurs because the carbon tax base (F in (II.13)) declines with abatement.  Eventually,
                                               
30 The intercept of the quota curve is somewhat lower than that implicit in the numerical model of Bovenberg
and Goulder (1996a), which incorporates a much more detailed treatment of the tax system.  In their model, a
carbon tax with revenues recycled through lump-sum transfers is efficiency-reducing unless marginal benefits
from emissions reduction exceed $55 per ton.  This policy would be equivalent to the above quota policy if there
were no taxation of quota rents.  When we assume no taxes on quota rents in the present model, the intercept of
the marginal cost curve rises to $29.4 per ton (see Section V).  The bulk of the difference results because we
assume a lower (compensated) labor supply elasticity than in their model (we assume 0.3 for this elasticity while
Bovenberg and Goulder assume 0.6).  In addition Bovenberg and Goulder (1996a) incorporate pre-existing taxes
on gasoline, which increases marginal abatement costs.
31 We compare average costs, rather than total costs, because baseline (unregulated) emissions are higher in the
absence of a labor tax.  As noted earlier, eliminating the labor tax encourages labor supply
32 The ratio of average costs between the first- and second-best setting is constant with respect to the amount of
emissions reduction, in the carbon tax case.  This is because the marginal net loss from the tax-interaction and
revenue-recycling effects changes in proportion to the slope of the primary marginal cost of emissions reduction.Parry, Williams, and Goulder  RFF 97-18-REV
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marginal tax revenue would become negative (when the downward sloping part of the Laffer
curve is reached).  In the limit, at 100 percent emissions reduction, the total cost of the tax and
quota are identical.  At this point, no revenues are raised under the tax, and hence there is no
revenue-recycling effect and no difference between the tax and quota policies.33
Our results indicate that in a second-best setting, under a carbon quota (or
grandfathered tradable permits) even "small" amounts of abatement involve large costs.
Thus, for example, the total cost of using a quota to reduce emissions by five percent is (a
substantial) $1.75 billion per annum.  These costs reflect the presence of a significant tax-
interaction effect (that is not offset by a revenue-recycling effect).34
C.   Efficiency Impacts under Second-Best Optimal Emissions Reduction
The second-best optimal emissions reduction is easily inferred from Figure 1: it is
where a given (constant) marginal benefits curve intersects the applicable marginal cost curve.
The second-best optimal emissions reduction under the tax is slightly less than 90 percent of
the optimal reduction when there is no pre-existing labor tax.  Under the carbon quota, the
optimal emissions reduction is zero if damages are below $17.8 per ton.  If damages are
"high," say $60 per ton, the optimal emissions reduction is 12.3 percent and 19.5 percent
respectively, under the quota and tax, and 21.7 percent if there were no labor tax.
Figure 3 (see page 37) shows the maximum efficiency gain - that is, the efficiency
gain from the second-best optimal emissions reduction – under each policy as a function of
environmental damages per ton of emissions.  For any level of damages, the maximum
efficiency gain under the carbon tax is around 75 percent of the maximum gain when there is
no labor tax.  However for the carbon quota, the maximized efficiency gain is much less; even
if damages are $70 per ton, the maximum efficiency gain is only $6 billion, or 36 percent of
the maximum gain in a first-best setting.
D.   Efficiency Impacts under the Pigouvian Rule
Figure 4 (see page 38) shows the efficiency impact under the carbon tax and quota, if
the Pigouvian or first-best rule is followed: that is, if the regulation reduces carbon emissions
by the same fraction as the optimal policy in a world without labor taxes.  Under the carbon
tax, the efficiency change is always positive, and around 75 percent of that when there is no
pre-existing labor tax, for any level of damages.  However, imposing the carbon quota at the
Pigouvian level reduces efficiency, unless damages exceed $55 per ton.  This welfare loss can
be substantial; for example, it is $2.1 billion, if damages per ton are $20.  Even if damages are
$100 per ton, the efficiency gain from the quota is only $8.9 billion, or 30 percent of the gain
                                               
33 For more discussion of this see Goulder et al. (1997).
34 Similar results to those in Figures 1 and 2 were obtained by Goulder et al. (1997), in their study of the SO2
permit program.  They estimated that the threshold benefit level below which an SO2 quota cannot increase
welfare is $103 per ton.  In their equivalent of Figure 2, the cost of the 50 percent emissions reduction mandated
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interaction effects are larger.  Thus, increasing the tax rate leads to a more than proportionate
increase in marginal costs.35
Row 6 illustrates that marginal costs from proportionate emissions reductions are not
sensitive to changing the share of the fossil fuel sector in gross domestic product.  While this
change increases the sensitivity of consumption goods prices to fossil fuel prices, it also
means that a ton of emissions reduction can be achieved with a smaller change in fossil fuel
prices.  Hence the cost of emissions reduction remains roughly the same.
Our previous experiments assumed that the rents generated by an emissions quota are
taxed at the same rate as labor income.  Thus, even the quota policy generates government
revenue and enjoys a small revenue-recycling effect.36  Row 7 indicates that if quota rents are
not taxed, the marginal cost of emissions reduction is greater, and the intercept is higher.
Thus, the efficiency disadvantage of the quota is reduced to the extent that taxes are imposed
on quota rents.  However, as shown in section II.B, these rents would have to be taxed 100
percent in order for the quota to suffer no efficiency disadvantage relative to the carbon tax.
VI.   CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
In this paper we have used analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to
examine the efficiency impacts of revenue-neutral carbon taxes and quotas (or grandfathered
carbon permits) in a second-best setting with pre-existing labor taxes.  For each of these
policies, the efficiency costs are considerably higher than would be the case in the absence of
prior taxes.  These higher costs reflect the tax-interaction effect: the efficiency cost stemming
from the regulation's impact on labor supply as a result of higher output prices and a reduction
in the real wage.
Pre-existing taxes imply especially high costs in the case of carbon quotas or
grandfathered carbon permits.  While emissions taxes and auctioned permits enjoy a revenue-
recycling effect that offsets much of the tax-interaction effect, quotas and grandfathered
permits policies do not exploit the revenue-recycling effect.  The associated efficiency
disadvantage can be very large: our central estimate is that, in the presence of prior labor
taxes, achieving a five percent reduction in carbon emissions is almost six times as costly
under a carbon quota as under a carbon tax; a 15 percent reduction is 2.6 times as costly.
Indeed, carbon quotas or grandfathered carbon permits may be unable to generate
positive efficiency gains.  Our central estimate is that the marginal social cost of emissions
reductions begins at $17.8 per ton for these policies.  By comparison, typical estimates of
marginal social benefits from carbon emissions reductions are below this level.  This suggests
                                               
35 This is because the (marginal) tax-interaction and revenue-recycling effects are proportional to the marginal
welfare cost of taxation, and this increases more than in proportion to the tax rate.
36 For example, at a 10 percent emissions reduction, it generates rent tax revenues of $9.7 billion.  However, the
quota reduces the labor tax base, causing a loss of labor tax revenues that more than offsets the rent tax revenue,
so the overall revenue change is -$1.6 billion. In contrast, a carbon tax with the same effect on emissions
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that policies like carbon quotas and grandfathered carbon permits will be efficiency-reducing-
regardless of the level of carbon abatement.  In contrast, carbon tax policies can be efficiency-
improving (provided that the level of abatement is not too great) because the marginal social
costs of emissions reduction start at zero.  In general, our results indicate that ignoring pre-
existing tax distortions can give rise to highly misleading conclusions about the sign, as well
as the magnitude, of the efficiency impacts from carbon abatement policies.
Some limitations to our analysis deserve mention.  The analytical and numerical
models are static, ignoring in particular the dynamics of capital accumulation.  Considering
capital as well as labor would introduce another relevant consideration in assessing the overall
efficiency impacts: now these impacts would also depend on (1) pre-existing inefficiencies in
relative taxation of labor and capital, and (2) the extent to which carbon abatement policies
might reduce these inefficiencies by shifting the tax burden from one factor to another.
Bovenberg and Goulder (1996b) indicate that for the U.S. economy, capital appears to be
overtaxed relative to labor; that is, the marginal excess burden of capital taxes appears to be
higher than that of labor taxes.  In this setting, carbon abatement policies that ultimately shift
the tax burden toward labor will induce a beneficial tax-shifting effect that mitigates the
efficiency costs.  The reverse is true if abatement policies shift more of the tax toward capital.
Empirical analysis by Bovenberg and Goulder suggests that abatement policies tend to shift
the burden toward capital, since the energy sector is relatively capital intensive.  Thus our
exclusive focus on labor may have biased downward our assessment of efficiency costs.
Another limitation of our analysis is that it ignores pre-existing distortions attributable
to non-tax factors such as non-competitive market structures.  Browning (1994) suggests that
non-tax distortions add another 30 percent to the distortion in the labor market created by
taxes.  If so, incorporating non-tax distortions into our analysis would significantly increase
the importance of second-best interactions and reduce the efficiency gains from carbon
abatement policies.37
In other respects, however, our analysis may understate the efficiency gains from
carbon abatement policies.  First, by employing static models we disregard dynamic issues
associated with the benefits from carbon abatement.  Marginal damages from carbon
emissions (or benefits from emissions abatement) could increase with CO2 concentrations (for
example, the concentration-damage relationship could exhibit significant threshold effects).
If this is the case, and if CO2 concentrations continue to rise, then marginal damages from
CO2 emissions (marginal benefits from abatement) will increase over time.  Under such
circumstances, a carbon quota might be able to yield efficiency gains at some future date,
when marginal damages are significantly higher.  (However, in efficiency terms, it will
always be better to adopt the carbon tax.)  Second, carbon abatement policies - particularly
carbon taxes - can produce dynamic efficiency gains by stimulating the invention and
diffusion of less-carbon-intensive production technologies.  This is especially important to the
extent that there are market failures in the research market that have not been fully corrected
                                               
37 On the significance of monopoly price distortions, in particular, see also Oates and Strassmann (1984).Parry, Williams, and Goulder  RFF 97-18-REV
23
by other government policies.38  Third, the prospects for efficiency gains also improve if one
considers ancillary benefits from carbon abatement policies, such as benefits from the
reduction in other fossil-fuel-related pollutants (e.g. sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides and
particulates).
Finally, our analysis ignores distributional considerations.  The decision whether to
introduce a carbon tax or carbon quota fundamentally affects the distribution of wealth
between taxpayers, on the one hand, and owners and employees of fossil-fuel-producing
firms, on the other.  Quota policies leave rents in producers' hands, while carbon taxes
effectively tax these rents away.  Some analysts might invoke these distributional impacts to
favor the quota over the tax.  The second-best issues examined in this paper do not diminish
the importance of these distributional considerations, but at the same time they indicate that
forgoing the redistribution towards taxpayers has efficiency costs that are much greater than
would be suggested by a first best analysis.
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